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Abstract
We consider a theoretical model in which unions not only take the outside option into
account, but also base their wage-setting decisions on an internal reference, called the
fairness reference. Wage and employment outcomes and the shape of the aggregate wage-
setting curve depend on the weight and the size of the fairness reference relative to the
outside option. If the fairness reference is relatively high compared to the outside option,
higher wages and lower employment than in the standard model will prevail. If hit by
an adverse technology shock, the economy will then react with a stronger downward ad-
justment in employment, whereas real wages are more rigid than in the standard model.
With a low fairness reference the opposite results are obtained. An increase in the fair-
ness weight amplifies the deviations of wages and employment from those of the standard
model. It also leads to an increase in the degree of real wage rigidity if the fairness refer-
ence is high and an increase in the degree of real wage flexibility if the fairness reference
is low. Thus, higher wages go hand in hand with more pronounced wage stickiness.
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1 Introduction
Up to now, most models of unionized labor markets are strictly bound to the assumptions
of classical homo economicus and neglect issues of fairness totally, see Pencavel (1991),
Flanagan (1993), and Booth (1995). This is in line with the pioneering work of Dunlop
(1944) who was the first to model union behavior using the neoclassical framework. Dun-
lop’s approach got heavily criticized by Ross (1948), who, among other things, considered
equity comparisons and fairness to be major issues in union wage determination.
In the light of the available empirical evidence, it is highly likely that fairness in the
form of relative comparisons indeed plays an important role for the wage–setting process
when unions bargain with firms over wages. Clark and Oswald (1996), using data collected
from 5,000 British workers, found evidence that utility does not only depend on absolute
income, but also on income relative to a reference level. Based on a sample of 16,000
British workers, Brown et al. (2008) found further evidence for relative pay considerations
and, more specifically, for the importance of the ordinal rank of an individual’s wage.
Bewley (1999), having interviewed over 200 business executives in the United States,
points out the importance of within firm comparisons which matter to workers when
assessing the wage paid to be fair or not. Strøm (1995) found empirical evidence that
Norwegian unions compare wages to an internal reference. Agell and Bennmarker (2003)
and (2007) did a representative survey on wage setters in Sweden. According to their
results wages are compared to a within firm reference level as well as to the outside
option.1
Results from experimental economics and psychology also make it evident that it is
a too narrow conception of utility if workers, or agents in general, are restricted to care
only about material gains. Especially in settings with incomplete contracts, such as labor
contracts, the phenomenon of reciprocal behavior based on the notion of fairness plays an
important role, see, for example, Fehr et al. (1998), Fehr et al. (2002), Charness (2004),
and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
1See Brown et al. (2008) for a more extensive overview.
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Up to now, fairness did not enter the labor union literature except some works dis-
cussing union rivalry, see Oswald (1979) and Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984).2 Sessions
(1993) is one of the few exceptions incorporating behavioral assumptions (“status”) in
a wage–setting model. “Few models of unions [...] consider the role of equity concerns
on wage determination. This seems like a particularly egregious omission, however, for
even the most casual acquaintance with collective bargaining teaches one that equity
comparisons are both rife and important” (Kaufman 2002, p. 147).
In the light of the Dunlop-Ross controversy as well as the above mentioned evidence,
it is the key idea of our paper to include fairness considerations into a labor union model
to bring theory closer to real–world wage setting. Workers care about fairness and la-
bor unions have the necessary market power to transform these fairness considerations
into actual market outcomes. By trying to make up for the “egregious omission” we
contribute, over half a century later, to bridge the gap between Dunlop and Ross. We
demonstrate that the inclusion of fairness considerations into a union’s utility function
profoundly changes the workings of the wage–setting process and the reaction of the ag-
gregate economy to macroeconomic shocks. We proceed as follows. The next section
explains how we include fairness into the union’s utility function and how this affects the
labor union’s marginal rate of substitution between wages and employment. Section 3
presents the theoretical model. We first analyze the wage-setting behavior of the union
on the micro level and then discuss the implications for the wage-setting curve and for
labor-market outcomes on the aggregate level. In Section 4 it is analyzed how fairness
modifies the reaction of the economy if hit by an adverse technology shock. Section 5
concludes.
2There exists some literature which pursued the wage reference perspective to explain wage rigidity,
see Pehkonen (1990).
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2 Fairness in the Union Utility Function
We consider firm–level labor unions and assume that all employed workers are members
of the union. Workers who are dismissed or who voluntarily leave the firm also leave the
labor union. Each union member in firm i obtains a rent Ωi (measured in terms of utility)
that is generated by this employment relationship. Total utility Ui of the labor union is
this rent times the number of workers Ni employed at firm i:
3
Ui = Ni · Ωi (1)
In traditional union models the rent is equal to the utility differential Ωsi = u(wi)− u(w),
where the superscript s denotes the “standard model”, wi denotes the real wage in firm i
and w some expected alternative income the worker would earn when he or she is not
employed at firm i. Hence, w serves as an external reference wage that is also called
the outside option or simply the outside wage. If the earned wage does not exceed this
reference, no rent is obtained. In this case the utility of being a union member in the firm
under consideration equals zero. In traditional labor union models it is argued that the
external reference is all that should matter for workers.
We integrate fairness considerations into this setup by assuming that workers also
obtain a utility gain when they perceive the wage paid to be equitable. Noticing that
“fairness always seemed to be judged by making some kind of wage comparison” (Rees,
1993, p. 244) and that “comparisons play a large and often dominant role as a standard
of equity in the determination of wages under collective bargaining” (Ross, 1948, p. 50),
we assume that employees compare their wage with the firm’s output per worker Yi/Ni to
assess whether the firm pays a fair wage. This assumption is in line with Danthine and
Kurmann (2007) and Koskela and Scho¨b (2009) who made a similar assumption within
efficiency–wage models.4
3We do not take the heterogeneity of agents into account, thus neglecting the question of preference
aggregation and principal-agent problems within the union.
4In our model all workers and workplaces are identical, so in each firm only one wage is paid. We
therefore do not analyze the consequences of a fair or unfair wage structure within a firm, though this
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To simplify the general equilibrium analysis, union members are assumed to be risk-
neutral, implying u(w) = w. However, the qualitative results would not change if
preferences were instead represented by a CRRA utility function of the form u(w) =
w1−β/(1− β). More specifically, Ωi is defined as
Ωi = Ωi(wi, Ni) ≡ ρ
[
wi − υ ·
Yi
Ni
]
+ (1− ρ) [wi − w] , (2)
with 0 ≤ ρ < 1 and 0 < υ < 1. Labor is the only variable input of production, hence
Yi = Yi(Ni). Notice that with ρ = 0 the standard model of a rent–maximizing union
is obtained, whereas with ρ → 1 only the fairness reference matters. With 0 < ρ < 1
the rent Ωi is a weighted average of a “fairness (or psychological) rent” (the term in the
first bracket) and a “material rent” (the term in the second bracket) with ρ and 1 − ρ
being the respective weights of these utility components. Having workers caring about
both, we capture the insight of Agell and Bennmarker (2003, p. 25) that “both internal
and external wages are important considerations in the local wage bargain.” Notice that
the marginal rate of substitution between material rent and fairness rent depends on the
parameter ρ which is called the “fairness parameter”.
The first term on the right–hand side of eq. (2), according to which workers compare
their wage with their contribution to the firm’s output, is in line with Bewley (1999) and
Rees (1993) who consider fairness to be a local phenomenon, meaning that wage compar-
isons are based on a reference which is close by. To ensure non–negative profits, wages can
not be higher than average productivity. Employees know that and act rationally in not
setting the fairness reference level too high. This is captured by the factor 0 < υ < 1 in
the definition of the fairness reference in eq. (2). In the following we interpret the param-
eter υ as describing the size of the fairness reference. The fairness reference mirrors the
principle of dual entitlement, see Kahneman et al. (1986b). Workers (and firms) behave
as if they have an entitlement to the terms of the reference level. If the earned wage is
higher than the fairness reference workers derive psychological utility whether or not the
wage is low compared to the outside wage. With regard to the second term in eq. (2),
also is a relevant aspect of the wage formation process.
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Koskela and Scho¨b (2009, p. 81) ascribe unionization to play a “leading role here since it
increases workers’ knowledge about external wages”.5
To see the implications of the labor union’s utility function more clearly, the marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) between employment and wages is computed:
MRS =
∂Ui/∂Ni
∂Ui/∂wi
=
wi − w − ρ [εY N · υ · (Yi/Ni)− w)]
Ni
, (3)
where εY N denotes the elasticity of Yi with respect to Ni. We assume that the production
function is subject to diminishing marginal returns to labor which are important for the
workings of the model later on. Because of this assumption the elasticity of output with
respect to employment is smaller than one.
The expression in eq. (3) can be easily compared with the marginal rate of substitution
in the standard model by setting the fairness parameter ρ equal to zero. In this case
results:
MRSs =
∂Usi /∂Ni
∂Usi /∂wi
=
wi − w
Ni
(4)
Obviously, the difference in the marginal rate of substitution, and therefore in the slope
of the indifference curve, is determined by the marginal utility of employment. In the
standard case ∂Usi /∂Ni denotes the rent Ω
s
i which the marginal worker receives. In the
general setting it holds that ∂Ui/∂Ni = Ωi+Ni∂Ωi/∂Ni. Notice that the difference in the
rents obtained depends on whether the fairness reference is higher, equal or lower than
the outside wage, or in more formal terms Ωi ⋚ Ωsi if υ(Yi/Ni) − w R 0. Because the
rent Ωi is a positive function of the firm’s employment level, ∂Ui/∂Ni denotes not only
the rent Ωi which the marginal worker receives, but additionally the change of the rent for
all workers already employed. The latter effect arises because an increase in employment
leads to a decline in output per worker, thereby lowering the fairness reference level. This
leads to an increased differential to the wage paid, thus increasing fairness utility for
all workers taken together by υ · (1 − εY N) · (Yi/Ni), where (1 − εY N) is the elasticity
5However, they disregard their insight by discussing the importance of the external wage within an
efficiency wage model instead of a labor union model.
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of labor productivity with respect to employment in absolute values. Summing up, the
difference in the marginal utility of employment does not only depend on the different
rents of the marginal worker but also on the effect of a change in employment on the rent
of all non-marginal workers. The net effect of the fairness reference on marginal utility of
employment is equal to υ ·εYN · (Yi/Ni). This expression must be compared to the outside
option in order to determine whether marginal utility of employment (and therefore the
MRS) is higher or lower than the one in the standard model.
For the trade-off between wages and employment therefore the following three cases
can be distinguished:
MRS < MRSs for υ · εY N ·
Yi
Ni
> w case 1
MRS = MRSs for υ · εY N ·
Yi
Ni
= w case 2 (5)
MRS > MRSs for υ · εY N ·
Yi
Ni
< w case 3
In case 1 ∂Ui/∂Ni is smaller than in the standard case, which leads the union to be willing
to give up more employment for an increase in wages. Thus, the indifference curve runs
flatter in wi − Ni space than in the standard case. This case occurs when the fairness
reference is of such a size that the rent of the marginal worker Ωi plus the change in the
fairness utility of all workers already employed is below the standard rent. Cases 2 and
3 can be interpreted analogously. Note that these cases are independent of the fairness
weight ρ. What matters is the relative size of the fairness reference.
This discussion shows that the trade-off between wages and employment depends on
whether and how social norms are included into the analysis. In line with this notion
fairness considerations already found their way into the labor market literature, espe-
cially in efficiency wage theory, see, for example, Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen
(1990).6 In the innovative work of Danthine and Kurmann (2006) the “internal reference
perspective” is developed by including a fairness based utility function in an efficiency
6More recently, fairness considerations are also taken into account in the international trade literature,
see, e.g., Egger and Kreickemeier (2012).
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wage model. Koskela and Scho¨b (2009) expand this model by considering as relevant ref-
erence a weighted average of the internal and external perspective. Because of the linear
specification of Ωi in eq. (2), this is equivalent to our formulation. Nevertheless, we would
like to point out that here the references gain a different interpretation, more in line with
findings from psychology. References are crucial to perform judgments of fairness, see
Kahneman et al. (1986a). The choice of these reference transactions are subject to fram-
ing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986 and Kubon-Gilke, 1990) which makes it rather
implausible to determine a reference as weighted average of two references. The definition
of Ωi stresses the assumption that workers derive utility from fairness considerations as
well as consumption possibilities with each having a single reference level.7 The notion
to incorporate material and fairness utility can already be found in a paper of Rabin
(1993). Considering the importance ascribed to unions in this context by Agell and Ben-
nmarker (2003) and (2007) or by Koskela and Scho¨b (2009) this paper, to the best of our
knowledge, is the first to explicitly introduce fairness in the union wage–setting process.
Furthermore we do not only analyze the implications of the weights of the references, but
also consider the impact of the relative size of the fairness reference on the level of wages
and employment, and the degree of wage rigidity.
3 The Model
3.1 Wages and employment at the firm level
The goods market is described by the standard monopolistic competition framework. In
the economy is a continuum of firms, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], each of which has a labor
demand function Ni = Ni(wi) with ∂Ni/∂wi < 0. Labor unions unilaterally determine
wages at the firm level.8 The maximization of union utility in eq. (1) and eq. (2) subject
7Of course, the fairness reference influences wages set and therefore has an effect on consumption.
8We consider a monopoly union model instead of a bargaining model in order to keep the analysis as
simple as possible. A Nash bargaining model would lead to the same qualitative results.
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to the labor demand function leads to:
Ni
[
∂Ωi
∂wi
+
∂Ωi
∂Ni
∂Ni
∂wi
]
= −
∂Ni
∂wi
Ωi (6)
In the utility maximum the marginal utility of wages (on the left-hand side) equals
marginal costs (on the right-hand side). Marginal costs reflect the fact that the dis-
missed employees loose the rent related to the employment relationship. Marginal utility
comprises both a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect is the increase in the
rent Ωi for all employees because of the increase in the wage rate. The indirect effect
emerges because the resulting decrease in employment increases labor productivity and
therefore the fairness reference. As a consequence, the fairness rent decreases for all em-
ployees. The indirect effect only appears because of the inclusion of fairness considerations
into the analysis. This effect lowers marginal utility of wages and cet. par. leads to lower
wage pressure in comparison to the standard model. However, the rent Ωi that is lost
in case of dismissal also differs from the traditional model. For example, if the fairness
reference is higher than the outside wage, then Ωi < Ω
S, hence marginal cost is lower
than in the standard model. In order to see whether the real wage is higher or lower than
in the standard model, we rewrite eq. (6) as
wi =
εNW
εNW − 1
{
w + ρ
[
υ · εY N ·
Yi
Ni
− w
]}
, (7)
where εNW denotes the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the real wage (in
absolute values). To facilitate the comparison with the standard model (in which ρ = 0),
we now consider a more specific version of the model in which the labor demand elasticity
is constant and therefore does not depend on the real wage. To derive a labor demand
function with this property, it is assumed that each firm faces a goods demand function
of the form Yi = p
−η
i Y with η > 1, where pi is the price of the firm’s product relative to
the aggregate price level. The elasticity of the demand for goods is constant and equals η
(in absolute values). The variable Y denotes an index of aggregate output which from
the firm’s point of view is taken to be exogenous because of the assumed large number
of firms. The production function is Yi = AN
α
i with 0 < α < 1, where A describes the
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state of technology. The elasticity of output with respect to employment, εY N , equals the
parameter α. Profit maximization of the firm leads to the following labor demand (LD)
function:
Ni = Ni(wi) =
[
ακAκ Y 1−κ w−1i
]1/(1−ακ)
(8)
where κ ≡ (η − 1)/η. As a consequence, the elasticity of labor demand with respect to
the real wage is constant and equals εNW = 1/(1−ακ) in absolute values. In this case, it
only depends on the terms in square brackets in eq. (7) whether the inclusion of fairness
considerations lowers or increases wage pressure in comparison to the standard model.
This leads to the same case distinctions that have already been derived for the differences
in the marginal rate of substitution in eq. (5). It holds that
wi > w
s
i and Ni < N
s
i in case 1: υαANi
α−1 > w
wi = w
s
i and Ni = N
s
i in case 2: υαANi
α−1 = w
wi < w
s
i and Ni > N
s
i in case 3: υαANi
α−1 < w
In Appendix A.1 it is shown that the optimum wage at the firm level is a strictly increasing
function of the size of the fairness reference υ, whereas optimum employment is strictly
decreasing in that parameter. Moreover, there exists a specific value υ˜ ∈ (0, 1) that
generates case 2. It can therefore be concluded that, depending on the parameter υ,
all three cases represent possible outcomes at the firm level. Note that if wages and
employment deviate from the respective levels of the standard model, i.e. if the term in
square brackets in eq. (7) is not equal to zero, the fairness parameter ρ amplifies the
deviations of wages and employment from those of the standard model. The direction of
the change depends on which of the above cases prevails.
3.2 The aggregate wage-setting curve
In equilibrium all prices and wages are identical, thus pi = 1 and wi = w. Workers
are homogenous and given by a [0-1] continuum such that Ni = n, where n denotes
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the employment rate. In order to derive the wage-setting equation, the outside option
must be specified more precisely. It is assumed that with probability n workers get a job
elsewhere in the economy and earn w, whereas with probability (1 − n) workers become
unemployed and receive unemployment benefits b.9 Utility related to the outside option
then is w ≡ nw + (1 − n)b. Taking account of eq. (7), the labor demand elasticity and
the production function introduced in the preceding section, the following equation for
the wage-setting curve (WS) can be derived:
w =
ρυαAnα−1 + (1− ρ)(1− n)b
ακ− (1− ρ)n
(9)
Wages are set as markup on the fairness reference and unemployment benefits. In contrast,
in the standard model (with ρ = 0) wages are set as markup on unemployment benefits
only:
ws =
1− n
ακ− n
b (10)
In the standard model the wage-setting curve approaches an asymptote at nsmax = ακ < 1
that constitutes an upper bound for employment. In contrast, in the fairness model the
WS curve reaches an asymptote at n = ακ/(1 − ρ). If 0 < ρ < 1 − ακ, this asymptote
defines the upper bound for the employment rate, denoted nmax. In the complementary
case, 1− ακ ≤ ρ < 1, the asymptote of the WS curve is not a binding constraint for the
employment rate, because it must hold that n ≤ 1. In this case nmax = 1.
Computing the slope of the wage-setting curve defined in eq. (9), one obtains:
∂w
∂n
=
[
(2− α)(1− ρ)− ακ(1− α) 1
n
]
ρυαAnα−1 + [(1− ρ)− ακ](1− ρ)b
[ακ− (1− ρ)n]2
(11)
It is easy to see that in the standard model the wage-setting curve is positively sloped over
the whole range of admissible employment rates 0 < n < nsmax. In contrast, in the fairness
9The assumption that the employment probability equals the employment rate is made for simplicity.
Beissinger and Egger (2004) consider an intertemporal model and show for various benefit systems that
the employment probability in the steady state is a more complicated function of the (un)employment
rate.
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model the wage-setting curve follows a U–shaped pattern if the fairness parameter ρ is
not too high, see Appendix A.2 for details. For very high values of the fairness parameter
it is even possible that the wage-setting curve is negatively sloped over the whole range
of admissible employment rates.10 In Appendix A.2 it is also shown that the employment
rate, at which the U-shaped wage-setting curve reaches its minimum, rises with higher
values of the fairness parameter ρ and the size of the fairness reference υ. The intuition
behind the U–shape is the following. We have two wage references in the model: the
outside option and the fairness reference. At low levels of employment average produc-
tivity is high and so is the fairness reference. This leads unions to demand high wages.
As employment increases, average productivity declines and so does the fairness reference
which leads to more moderate wage demands. This explains the downward sloping section
of the WS–curve. However, the higher employment the higher is the outside option since
the chance to find a job elsewhere in the economy increases. This effect leads unions to
demand higher wages again. This explains the upward sloping section of the WS–curve.11
Given a not too high value of ρ, an increase in υ leads to a more pronounced U–shape
of the wage-setting curve. This is due to the fact that the mechanism just described is
stronger the higher the value of the fairness reference is.
Turning to the location of the wage-setting curve, the impact of a change in υ is
computed as:
∂w
∂υ
=
ραAnα−1
ακ− (1− ρ)n
> 0. (12)
Hence an increase in the size of the fairness reference, υ, leads to an upward shift of the
wage-setting curve. For an increase in the fairness parameter ρ one obtains
∂w
∂ρ
=
υαAnα−1 − w
ακ− (1− ρ)n
, (13)
10It can be shown that the second derivative of the wage-setting equation is positive for all admissible
employment rates. As a consequence the WS curve is convex. The proof is available on request.
11A non–standard shape for the wage-setting curve also results in the model of Sessions (1993). In
that model, the relative social pressures associated with unemployment and employment lead to a local
U–shape of the WS–curve. Koskela and Scho¨b (2009) derive a U–shaped WS–curve in their efficiency
wage model, too.
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where w ≡ nw + (1 − n)b. The sign of the numerator depends on the three cases that
have already been identified at the firm level, see Section 3.1. Taking into account that
w > b, the numerator is positive for relatively low employment rates, whereas for higher
employment rates the numerator is negative. This implies that an increase in ρ causes a
clockwise rotation of the wage-setting curve, i.e. for low n the WS curve moves upwards,
whereas for high n the WS curve moves downwards. Note that the sign of the numerator
also depends on the size of the fairness reference. A higher υ cet. par. increases the
numerator.
3.3 General Equilibrium
In the general equilibrium the inverse labor demand function is given by:
w = ακAnα−1 (14)
Using this equation and eq. (9) for the wage-setting curve, the equilibrium employment
rate n∗ and equilibrium wages w∗ can be determined. In Appendix A.3 some restrictions
for the size of the fairness reference υ are introduced to guarantee that 0 < n < nmax and
that the fairness reference exceeds unemployment benefits.12 A variation in the size of
the fairness reference υ leads to
∂n∗
∂υ
= −
ραAn∗(α−1)
(1 − ρ)[w∗ − b+ (1− α) (1−n
∗)
n∗
b]
< 0 (15)
∂w∗
∂υ
= −(1 − α)
w∗
n∗
∂n∗
∂υ
> 0 (16)
Equilibrium employment falls and wages increase with υ. As has been explained in Sec-
tion 2, an increase in υ leads to a smaller marginal utility of employment. This causes
rising wage pressure at the firm level, as has been made evident in Section 3.1. Since em-
ployment and wages are monotonous functions of υ, there also exists a threshold value υ˜
that leads to the same wage and employment levels as in the standard model. In Ap-
pendix A.4 it is shown that in this model υ˜ = ακ2. There it is also demonstrated that, in
12It can also be shown that multiple equilibria can be ruled out in this model. The proof is available
on request.
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line with the findings on the firm level, the following three cases can be distinguished:
w∗ > ws
∗ and n∗ < ns
∗ for case 1
w∗ = ws
∗ and n∗ = ns
∗ for case 2
w∗ < ws
∗ and n∗ > ns
∗ for case 3
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium using values for υ that lead to the three different cases.13
Equilibrium wages and employment are given by the intersection of the labor demand
curve and the wage-setting curve. It can be seen that an increase in υ leads to an upward
shift of the wage-setting curve, thereby increasing wages and lowering employment. More-
over it makes the U–shape more pronounced. Note, that figure 1(b), representing case 2,
produces the same equilibrium wage employment combination as the standard model. It
constitutes the threshold between case 1 and 3.
Figure 1: Variation of the fairness reference on the macro level (ρ = 0.5)
(a) Case 1 (υ = 0.8) (b) Case 2 (υ = 0.648) (c) Case 3 (υ = 0.55)
13We calibrated the model with α = 0.8, κ = 0.9, A = 1, b = 0.2. The calibration results for wages
and employment are not meant to describe actual economies, rather to demonstrate in a qualitative way
how equilibrium outcomes depend on the three cases identified in this paper. It would certainly require
a more complicated model to match the theoretical outcomes with the data.
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Turning to a change in the fairness parameter ρ, one obtains
∂n∗
∂ρ
= −
(ακ− n∗)υAn∗(α−1) − (1− n∗)κb
− 1
α
(1− ρ)[ακ− (1− ρ)n∗][w∗ − b+ (1− α) (1−n
∗)
n∗
b]
(17)
∂w∗
∂ρ
= −(1 − α)
w∗
n∗
∂n∗
∂ρ
(18)
Our results on the firm level suggest that the fairness parameter ρ again acts as an
amplifier for the deviations of employment and wages from the corresponding values of
the standard model. This result is passed on to the aggregate level. It is the numerator
in eq. (17) which determines the sign of the partial derivatives. As has been shown in
Appendix A.4, the numerator in eq. (17) corresponds to the three cases that have already
been identified on the firm level. Hence, it ultimately rests upon υ and the implied cases
how ρ affects employment and wages.
∂w∗
∂ρ
> 0
∂n∗
∂ρ
< 0 in case 1
∂w∗
∂ρ
= 0
∂n∗
∂ρ
= 0 in case 2
∂w∗
∂ρ
< 0
∂n∗
∂ρ
> 0 in case 3
Figure 2 demonstrates how an increase in the fairness parameter increases wages and
lowers employment in case 1 (that prevails because of a relatively high fairness reference).
In contrast, as shown in Figure 3, in case 3 (i.e. with a relatively low fairness reference) an
increase in the fairness parameter has the opposite implications: it leads to lower wages
and higher employment.
To summarize, the fairness reference as well as the fairness parameter have a major
impact on aggregate outcomes. The size of the fairness reference determines the different
cases which decide in which direction equilibrium wages and employment move when the
fairness weight increases. The fairness parameter, measuring the weight which unions put
on fairness, takes the working mode of an amplifier. The higher the fairness parameter,
the more sensitive the WS curve reacts to changes in the size of the reference. As a
conclusion, it is not only about whether, but also how fairness is included into union’s
preferences.
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Figure 2: Variation of the fairness parameter in case 1 (υ = 0.8)
(a) ρ = 0.3 (b) ρ = 0.5 (c) ρ = 0.7
Figure 3: Variation of the fairness parameter in case 3 (υ = 0.55)
(a) ρ = 0.3 (b) ρ = 0.5 (c) ρ = 0.7
4 Macroeconomic implications of technology shocks
This section analyzes how the inclusion of fairness considerations affects the response of
wages and employment to macroeconomic shocks. The focus is on adverse technology
15
shocks that are modeled as a reduction in the parameter A. As a consequence, the labor
demand curve (LD) shifts downwards, since
∂w
∂A
∣∣∣∣
LD
= ακnα−1 > 0 (19)
In the standard model this shift in the LD curve is all that happens, because a change
in the technology parameter A does not affect the WS curve. The downward-shifting LD
curve then leads to a decline in both real wages and employment as shown in Figure 4.14
Figure 4: Adverse technology shock in the standard model
Contrary to the standard model, in the fairness model the decline in A also shifts the
WS curve downwards, because the technology parameter is part of the fairness reference:
∂w
∂A
∣∣∣∣
WS
=
ρυαnα−1
ακ− (1− ρ)n
> 0 (20)
As is evident from eq. (20), the extent of the WS shift depends on the magnitude of ρ and
υ, i.e. how much the union cares about fairness and of which size the fairness reference
is. Comparing equations (19) and (20) reveals that the shift of the WS curve is less
pronounced than that of the LD curve.15 It therefore matters for the equilibrium reaction
14Throughout this section the shock is parameterized to △A = −0.1.
15The maximal shift of the WS curve is obtained for υ = υmax (which implies n→ 0) and with υ = υmin
(which implies n → 1). This maximal shift equals that of the LD curve. For the definition of υmax and
υmin see Appendix A.3.
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of wages and employment which shape the WS–curve has in or around the equilibrium.
Figure 5: Technology shock for different sizes of the fairness reference (ρ =
0.5)
(a) Case 1 (υ = 0.8) (b) Case 2 (υ = 0.648) (c) Case 3 (υ = 0.55)
Figure 5 shows the old and new equilibrium in all three cases. The dashed lines mark
the LD curve and the WS curve after the shock. In case 2 in Figure 5 b) the standard
model WS–curve (dotted line) is depicted additionally. This shows that in case 2 the
equilibrium reaction of wages and employment does not differ from the standard model.
As in the previous analysis, case 2 constitutes the threshold between case 1 and 3. In
case 1, depicted in Figure 5 a), the reaction in terms of employment is larger and in case 3,
depicted in Figure 5 c), the employment response is smaller. For wages it is exactly the
other way round. Thus in comparison to the standard model, wages are more rigid in
case 1 and more volatile in case 3. This pattern is due to the U–shape of the WS–curve.
In order to see this more clearly, in Figure 6 we consider small sections of Figure 5 a)
and c).
In case 1 the WS curve is upward sloping, but relatively flat, at the intersection with
the LD curve. Depending on the parameter values the WS curve could even be downward
sloping. The new equilibrium will therefore lie relatively far to the left compared to the
17
old equilibrium. The less upward sloping or the more downward sloping the WS–curve
in the old equilibrium, the stronger is the employment response and the weaker is the
change in wages. Hence, case 1 is characterized by real wage rigidity.
Figure 6: Shift of the WS–curve
(a) Case 1 (ρ = 0.5, υ = 0.8) (b) Case 3 (ρ = 0.5, υ = 0.55)
In case 3, in the old equilibrium point the WS–curve is upward sloping and steeper
than in case 1. This leads to a weaker reaction in terms of employment and a stronger
reaction in wages. In case 3 real wages are even more volatile as they already are in the
standard model.
Since the fairness parameter ρ has an impact on the shape of the WS–curve, it also
evokes different equilibrium reactions. As depicted in figure 7, the higher the fairness
parameter in case 1 the longer is the downward sloping part of the WS and therefore
the more the accommodation takes place in terms of employment. Hence, in case 1
wage stickiness increases with the fairness parameter and employment gets more volatile.
However, in case 3 wage rigidity decreases with the fairness parameter, see figure 8. If
the fairness parameter is high enough as in figure 8 c), there is almost no reaction in
employment at all.
The intuition for these results is as follows. An adverse technology shock leads cet. par.
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Figure 7: Technology shock for different values of the fairness parameter in
case 1 (υ = 0.8)
(a) ρ = 0.3 (b) ρ = 0.5 (c) ρ = 0.7
Figure 8: Technology shock for different values of the fairness parameter in
case 3 (υ = 0.55)
(a) ρ = 0.3 (b) ρ = 0.5 (c) ρ = 0.7
to a decrease in the size of the fairness reference. The downward shift of the WS curve and
the (stronger) downward shift of the LD curve lead to a decline in wages and employment.
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Table 1: Relative change of wages compared to employment
Standard case 4.30
Case 1 (υ = 0.8) 2.05
Case distinctions Case 2 (υ = 0.648) 4.30
Case 3 (υ = 0.55) 8.01
ρ = 0.3 3.08
Case 1 (υ = 0.8) ρ = 0.5 2.05
ρ = 0.7 0.74
ρ = 0.3 5.47
Case 3 (υ = 0.55) ρ = 0.5 8.01
ρ = 0.7 61.00
In case 1 the wage level is relatively high and the employment rate is relatively low in
the initial equilibrium in comparison to the other cases. The reduction in employment
then leads to a strong increase in average productivity and to a corresponding strong
increase in the fairness reference thereby attenuating the decrease in wages. This effect
is getting more pronounced with an increase in the fairness parameter. In case 3 the
employment rate is higher than in case 1, because the wage level is lower. A change in
the employment rate at this level has a much smaller effect on average productivity and
therefore the fairness reference. The overall effect of an adverse technology shock then
leads to a significant drop in wages. Again this effect is getting more pronounced if the
fairness parameter increases. To summarize, it is evident that the inclusion of fairness
considerations does not always lead to real wage rigidity. Depending on the size of the
fairness reference it is even possible that wages are more volatile than in the standard
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model. Moreover, it turns out that wage pressure and wage rigidity are closely related
issues.
Table 1 summarizes the percentage change in wages relative to the percentage change in
employment for the three cases. In the standard model as well as in case 2 the percentage
change in wages is 4.3 times the percentage change in employment. This marks the
threshold. In case 1 wages are more rigid, in case 3 they are more volatile. With an
increasing preference for fairness these differences get amplified. As shown in Section 3.3
the same happens to the level of pay. Comparing the fairness model to the standard
model results in either higher wages and more rigidity or lower wages and less rigidity
depending on the size of the fairness reference and the fairness parameter.
5 Conclusions
The inclusion of fairness considerations leads to a different wage-setting behavior in union-
ized labor markets in comparison to that predicted by standard labor union models. In
our theoretical model unions not only take the outside option of union members into
account, but also base their wage-setting decisions on internal factors such as the output
per worker produced by the respective firms. It turns out that two parameters are of
special importance: first, the “fairness parameter” determining the relative weight of the
fairness reference, and second, a parameter determining the size of the fairness reference
relative to the size of the outside option.
The predictions of the theoretical model are driven by the fact that fairness consider-
ations change the trade-off between wages and employment for each labor union. Using
the standard model as benchmark three cases can be distinguished depending on the size
of the fairness reference, i.e. the size of the threshold wage level above that the labor
union will enjoy positive “fairness utility”. If the fairness reference is relatively high com-
pared to the outside option, marginal utility of employment is relatively low. In that
case, each union is willing to give up more employment for an increase in wages, leading
to higher wages and lower employment compared to the standard model without fairness
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considerations. If the size of the fairness reference is relatively low, the opposite results
are obtained. There also exists a specific value of the fairness reference for which the
same results as in the standard model are obtained. If wages and employment differ from
the respective levels of the standard model, an increase in the fairness parameter (i.e.
the fairness weight) amplifies the deviations of wages and employment from those of the
standard model. These results hold for the single union as well as on the aggregate level.
Fairness considerations also change the shape of the aggregate wage-setting curve. In
the standard model the wage-setting curve is upward sloping in real wage–employment
space. In contrast, in the fairness model the wage-setting curve follows a U–shaped
pattern if the fairness parameter is not too high. For very high values of the fairness
parameter it is even possible that the wage-setting curve is negatively sloped over the
whole range of admissible employment rates. It can also be shown that the employment
rate, at which the U–shaped wage–setting curve reaches its minimum, rises with higher
values of the fairness parameter and the size of the fairness reference. An increase in
the fairness reference leads to an upward shift of the wage-setting curve. In contrast, an
increase in the fairness parameter leads to a clockwise rotation of the wage-setting curve.
Given the different possible shapes of the wage-setting curve it can be shown that the
economy reacts in different ways to technology shocks. In the standard model an adverse
technology shock only shifts the labor demand curve downwards, leading to a reduction
in wages and in employment. If fairness considerations play a role, the wage–setting
curve shifts downwards as well. The reaction of employment and wages depends on the
three cases identified in this paper. If the fairness reference is relatively high, the decline
in employment is stronger and the reduction in wages is weaker than in the standard
model. In this scenario the inclusion of fairness considerations therefore leads to real wage
rigidity that is the more pronounced the higher the fairness weight is. However, fairness
considerations do not necessarily imply rigid wages. If the size of the fairness reference
is relatively low, a stronger wage reduction and a less pronounced decline in employment
compared to the standard model is observed. Again this effect is the stronger the higher
the fairness weight is.
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To summarize, it does not only matter if labor unions care about fairness, but also
how they do. Depending on the size and the weight of the fairness reference either higher
or lower real wage rigidity in comparison to the prediction of standard labor union models
can be observed. A high degree of wage rigidity and a high level of pay appear to go hand
in hand.
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A Appendix
A.1 Optimum employment and wages at the firm level
Using eqs. (7) and (8) and taking into account that Yi/Ni = AN
α−1
i , εNW = 1/(1 − ακ)
and εY N = α, optimum employment and wages are given by
(ακ)2AκY 1−κNi
ακ−1 = ραυANi
α−1 + (1− ρ)w (21)
wi =
w + ρ
[
αυANi
α−1 − w
]
ακ
(22)
It is evident that the wage is set as markup on the fairness reference and the outside
option. In contrast, in the standard model ρ = 0, hence the wage is set as markup on the
outside option only. Changing the size of the fairness reference υ yields:
∂Ni
∂υ
=
ραANi
α
(1− α)ραυANi
α−1 − (1− ακ)(ακ)2AκY 1−κNακ−1i
∂wi
∂υ
=
ρ
ακ
[
αANi
α−1 − (1− α)αυANi
α−2∂Ni
∂υ
]
The sign of the denominator of ∂Ni/∂υ is easily determined, since it follows from eq. (21)
that (ακ)2AκY 1−κNακ−1i > ραυANi
α−1. Noticing that (1 − ακ) > (1 − α) because 0 <
α < 1 and 0 < κ < 1, the following inequality is also true:
(1− ακ)(ακ)2AκY 1−κNακ−1i > (1− α)ραυANi
α−1
Hence the denominator in ∂Ni/∂υ is negative, leading to ∂Ni/∂υ < 0 and ∂wi/∂υ > 0.
The threshold value of υ generating case 2 is positive and given by
υ˜ =
w
αANi
α−1
Because of monopolistic competition, wages paid in each firm are lower than the marginal
product of labor. In Section 3.3 it will be argued that w is a weighted average of wages
elsewhere in the economy and unemployment benefits. Hence, w is lower than average
wages and is certainly lower than the marginal product of labor. As a consequence,
υ˜ ∈ (0, 1).
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A.2 The slope of the aggregate wage-setting curve
The slope of the wage-setting curve in the fairness model with 0 < ρ < 1 is taken from
eq. (11) and rewritten as
∂w
∂n
=
ΨA ρυAn
α−1 + Ψb b
[ακ− (1− ρ)n]2
(23)
with ΨA ≡ α
[
(2− α)(1− ρ)− ακ(1− α) 1
n
]
and Ψb ≡ [(1 − ρ) − ακ](1 − ρ). The sign of
the slope depends on the sign of the numerator. To determine the sign, two cases must
be distinguished.
Case (i): 0 < ρ < 1− ακ
In this case Ψb > 0. As has been outlined in Section 3.3, the employment rate is restricted
to the interval 0 < n < ακ/(1− ρ). Taking the upper limit for n into account, ΨA ≥ 0 for
ακ
(1− ρ)
(1− α)
(2− α)
≤ n <
ακ
1− ρ
(24)
which is sufficient (but not necessary) for ∂w/∂n > 0. Hence in the range defined by
eq. (24) the WS curve certainly is upward sloping. If
0 < n <
ακ
(1− ρ)
(1− α)
(2− α)
(25)
then ΨA < 0, but it may still hold that the slope of the wage-setting curve is positive.
However, if n → 0 then ΨA → (−∞). As a consequence, for low n the negative value of
the first term in the numerator dominates implying ∂w/∂n < 0. It can be concluded that
the U–shaped wage-setting curve reaches an interior minimum at an employment rate n˜,
with 0 < n˜ < ακ(1−α)/[(1−ρ)(2−α)]. Setting the numerator in eq. (23) to zero, implicit
differentiation reveals that ∂n˜/∂υ > 0 and ∂n˜/∂ρ > 0. The higher the fairness parameter
ρ and/or the higher the fairness reference υ, the higher is the employment rate n˜ at which
the wage-setting curve reaches its minimum.
Case (ii): 1− ακ ≤ ρ < 1
In this case Ψb ≤ 0. The wage-setting curve is now defined over the whole range 0 < n ≤ 1.
If the employment rate is in the range defined by eq. (25) it holds that ΨA < 0. Notice that
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in Case (ii) ακ/(1−ρ) ≥ 1. If ρ > 1− [ακ(1−α)/(2−α)], the upper limit for n in eq. (25)
would be greater than one and must therefore be replaced by one. For such high values of
the fairness parameter the wage-setting curve would therefore be downward-sloping over
all employment rates in the interval (0,1]. If 1− ακ < ρ < 1− [ακ(1− α)/(2− α)], there
is a range of employment rates, namely
ακ
(1− ρ)
(1− α)
(2− α)
≤ n ≤ 1, (26)
where ΨA > 0 holds. This is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a positively
sloped wage-setting curve. However, if n→ 1 then ∂w/∂n > 0. In this case there is again
an interior minimum at an employment rate n˜ implying a U–shaped wage-setting curve.
A.3 Parameter restrictions for the general equilibrium
There are two reasons, why the interval for the parameter υ determining the size of the
fairness reference has to be further restricted. First, it would be rather implausible if
the fairness reference would be lower than unemployment benefits. Second, it must be
guaranteed that the equilibrium employment rate n lies in the interval (0, 1].
With regard to the first reason, we assume that υAnα−1 > b. With that we are
in line with the common notion that “comparison [is] always made upward rather than
downward” (Rees, 1993, p. 244). Since we get the highest lower bound of the fairness
reference for limn→nmax, this “Rees Assumption” (RA) leads to υ > υ
RA = (nmax)
1−α ·b/A.
For 0 < ρ < 1− ακ the upper bound for employment is given by nmax = ακ/(1− ρ). For
1− ακ ≤ ρ < 1 the upper employment threshold is nmax = 1.
With regard to the second reason, only in the case 1−ακ ≤ ρ < 1 a restriction for υ is
necessary to guarantee that n ≤ 1. Since ∂n/∂υ < 0 (compare Appendix A.1), a decrease
in υ leads to an increase in n. There must therefore be a lower bound υmin leading to
n = 1. This lower bound is derived from the macroeconomic equilibrium. Using the labor
demand equation (14) and the wage-setting equation (9), in equilibrium it holds that
ακAnα−1 =
ρυαAnα−1 + (1− ρ)(1− n)b
ακ− (1− ρ)n
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By solving the implicit equilibrium employment rate at limn→1 for υ, we get the restriction
υ > υmin = (ακ− (1− ρ))κ/ρ not only assuring that n∗ < 1 but also w∗ > b. Notice that
in the case 1−ακ ≤ ρ < 1 we therefore have two lower bounds υRA and υmin. Always the
larger of the two is binding.
In addition to the lower bound an upper bound for υ < υmax = ακ2/ρ exists for limn→0.
Again this is derived from the equilibrium employment rate. Moreover, we assume, that
υ can not be higher than 1. In the sense of fairness it would be contradictory to demand
something higher than the own productivity. Always the lower of the two upper bounds
for υ is binding.
Taken together these limits denote the range of all possible ρ− υ combinations gener-
ating an employment rate between zero and one (0 < n∗ < 1).
A.4 Case distinctions on the aggregate level
Aggregating the case distinctions of section 3.1 yields the following case distinctions in
the general equilibrium.
(ακ− n)υAnα−1 > (1− n)κb case 1
(ακ− n)υAnα−1 = (1− n)κb case 2
(ακ− n)υAnα−1 < (1− n)κb case 3
By rewriting the WS curve from eq. (9) as
w =
1− n
ακ− n
b+
ρα [(ακ− n)υAnα−1 − (1− n)κb]
(ακ− n)(ακ− (1− ρ)n)
, (27)
the case distinctions can be easily obtained, too. The first part of the equation equals the
standard WS curve from eq. (10). The second part already contains the case distinctions
in the numerator. Since employment and wages are monotonous functions of υ, it remains
to proof that there exists a υ˜ with max{υmin, υRA} < υ˜ < min{υmax, 1} which sets the
equation in brackets in equation (27) equal to 0. This is true for all parameter ranges
since υ˜ = ακ2. All three cases prevail on the aggregate level. They can be rewritten in
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the following short notation:
min{υmax, 1} > υ > υ˜ case 1
υ˜ = υ case 2
υ˜ > υ > max{υmin, υRA} case 3
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